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IntroductionIn the pursuit of their duties, union stewards often need information in possession of Management. All such information pertaining to the legitimate needs of the union for bargaining, grievance handling, etc., must be made available to the union. Stewards need to know what types of information are available and how to ask for it. This page is intended to assist stewards (and grievant) to get more familiar with this important topic. This is an excerpt from the book “The Legal Rights of Union Stewards”, by Robert M. Schwartz, published by Work Rights Press. The Legal Rights of Union Stewards can be ordered by clicking on the link More Books by Robert M. Schwartz, Union labor lawyer Union Right to InformationOne of the most useful tools in the NLRA is the right to obtain information from employers. Although this right is not explicit in the text of the NLRA, the Supreme Court has construed it from the requirement in Section 8(d) that employers and unions bargain collectively. Without access to information, unions cannot fulfill their responsibilities to negotiate, monitor, and enforce contracts. Refusals to provide information, or unreasonable delays, violate Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. WHEN TO REQUEST INFORMATIONEmployers sometimes assert that union rights are restricted to information needed for contract negotiations. This is not true. In NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co. (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that employers must furnish unions with information relevant to grievances. As a steward, you may request information to:
You can also request information when bargaining on midterm changes. (See Chapter 6.) The NLRB does not defer charges that allege a refusal to supply information. WHAT CAN YOU REQUEST?The obligation of an employer to provide information is extremely broad. It includes relevant documents, data, and facts. Information is considered relevant if it might be useful to the union or could lead to the identification of useful information. If management does not have the information in its possession, it must conduct a diligent effort to obtain it, including making requests of third parties with whom it has a relationship, such as contractors, customers, and parent corporations. Preconditions, such as an insistence that the union not disclose information to outsiders, may not be imposed unless the information meets a strict test of confidentiality. Information requests must be made in good faith. The request must relate to contract administration or bargaining, and the union must explain its reasons if asked by the employer. The union cannot use an information request for harassment purposes or to conduct a fishing expedition into the employer’s records. Information requests do more than obtain valuable data: they also discourage employers from violating the contract. Management may even settle a grievance to avoid supplying data or documents to the union. Information requests should be submitted for almost all grievances.. Documents. You are entitled to examine a wide variety of records to investigate a grievance or to prepare for bargaining. Here are some of the documents you can request:
Data. Employers must provide the union with lists, statistics, and other relevant data – even if management must spend hours or longer putting it together. You can request data on prior disciplinary actions and overtime assignments. Employers are not excused from producing relevant data because of the size of the union’s request. Requests for data going back five years have been enforced by the NLRB. Facts. Employers must answer pertinent factual inquiries. For a misconduct case, ask for the names and addresses of witnesses and descriptions of their testimony. For a subcontracting grievance, ask for a description of the work, the amount of the contract, and the reasons for the contract. For an arbitration hearing, ask for the names of persons that the employer intends to call to the stand. General inquiries. Employers must respond to general inquiries such as:
Disciplinary grievance. When grieving disciplinary action, always request a copy of the grievant’s personnel file. If unequal punishment is an argument in the case, ask for the names of other employees who have committed the same offense and the penalties imposed. In some circumstances, you can request information about supervisors and other non-unit employees. Contract interpretation grievance. When a grievance concerns disputed contract language, the dates and contents of any information which the employer is relying on, and descriptions of any incident which the employer contends support its position. Past practice grievance. If you are trying to enforce a past practice, and management denies that the practice has been consistent, ask for the dates and circumstances of all occasions on which management claims a departure from the practice. Health and safety grievance. If you are grieving an unsafe substance, request copies of any OSHA citations, documents from the employer concerning the substance. Discretionary leave grievance. If you are grieving the denial of a leave request, ask for records of requests by other employees over the past several years and the employer’s reasons for granting or not granting each request. Information about non-unit employees. You may request information about employees outside of the bargaining unit, including supervisors, when that information is relevant to a grievance. For example, if a unit employee is accused of violating a rule which equally applies to non-unit employees, you can request the names of non-unit employees, including supervisors, who have violated the rule, a description of each infraction, and a description of any discipline imposed. If you know of a particular non-unit employee or supervisor who has violated a rule that applies to unit and non-unit employees, you are entitled to information from the non-unit employee’s personnel file as well as any other records relevant to proving unequal discipline. Employer defenses based on the privacy of supervisors’ records have been rejected by the Board in these circumstances. Unions can prepare master information request forms and distribute them to stewards. EMPLOYER RESPONSESEmployers often make excuses to avoid supplying relevant information. Here are some that the NLRB has rejected:
Confidentiality. The major exception to the duty to provide information is confidentiality. Confidentiality refers to information which is either highly personal or highly sensitive. Individually identified medical records, psychological data, and aptitude test scores usually meet the highly personal standard. Records revealing the employer’s trade secrets, profits and losses, and product research often meet the highly sensitive standard. Employee addresses, telephone numbers, wage data, personnel files, and disciplinary records are not confidential. Nor are internal reports or studies, even if self-critical of the employer. To invoke the confidentiality defense, an employer must have a publicized and consistently enforced policy barring disclosure of the information in question. Moreover, the interests of the employer in preventing disclosure must outweigh the union’s need to obtain the requested information. An employer that asserts confidentiality must do so at the time it initially refuses to supply the information. The employer must also offer to make an arrangement with the union that accommodates both the employer’s confidentiality concerns and the union’s need for the requested information. Measures can usually be found to protect both sides. For example, if medical confidentiality is asserted, the employer can delete or black out the medical references. . DEADLINESUnder NLRB rules, an employer must respond promptly to a union information request. The acceptable time period, however, depends on the information requested. Unreasonable delay is just as serious an NLRA violation as outright refusal. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSNAME OF POTENTIAL GRIEVANT
PERSONNEL FILES
ATTENDANCE RECORDS
SECOND REQUEST
TOO MUCH REQUESTED?
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
SUPERVISOR
SECURITY INVESTIGATION
WITNESS NAME
HANDWRITING ANALYSIS
U.S. PRIVACY ACT
Abbreviations In the Text
A GLOSSARY OF LABOR TERMS Terms Bargaining Unit: A group of employees in a given workplace who have a sufficient similarity of interest to constitute a unit for the purpose of bargaining collectively with their employer. A bargaining unit is usually defined by the National Labor Relations Board, or similar federal, state or local agency. top Certification: Official recognition by a labor relations board that an employee organization is the exclusive representative for all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. top Contract, or Collective Bargaining Agreement: A formal written agreement over wages, hours and conditions of employment entered into by an employer and the union representing the employees in the bargaining unit. top Employee Assistance Program: A confidential information, support and referral service designed to help employees cope with personal problems which have a negative impact on their lives and, subsequently, on their work productivity. Deteriorating job performance can lead to an employer taking disciplinary action. Such programs often provide assistance in such situations as emotional stress, marital and family problems, financial and legal difficulties, and drug or alcohol abuse. top Free Rider: An employee who chooses not to join the union that has negotiated the contract over his/her wages and working conditions, and who reaps the benefits from that contract. Fringe Benefits: Vacations, holidays, insurance, medical benefits, pensions and other economic benefits that are provided to employees under the union contract; these are in addition to direct wages. top Labor Relations Board: Quasi-judicial agency set up under national or state labor relations acts. Its duties are: defining appropriate bargaining units; holding elections to determine if workers want union representation; certifying unions to represent employees; and applying legal provisions prohibiting certain employer or union unfair labor practices. top Picketing: The carrying of signs or the passing out of literature protesting working conditions or actions taken by the employer. Picketing occurs during a strike, or in the form of an informational picket. In this tactic, designed to put pressure on the employer, union members inform the public and other workers about the conditions they feel are unfair. top Representation Election: A vote conducted by an appropriate labor board or agency to determine whether a majority of the workers in a previously established bargaining unit want to be represented by a given union. top Scab: A person who continues to work, or who accepts employment, while the workers are on strike. By filling the jobs of striking workers, and keeping the employer operational, scabs may weaken or help break the strike. top Seniority: Length of service with an employer. Based on their seniority, preference can be accorded to employees in such areas as promotion, transfer, shift assignment, scheduling, vacation accrual, layoff, recall, etc. top Sexual Harassment: Any unwarranted and repeated sexual comments, looks, suggestions or physical contact that create an uncomfortable working environment for an employee. Sexual harassment is against the law (see pages 40-41).top Unfair Labor Practice: An employer or union practice forbidden by the National Labor Relations Act, the Civil Service Reform Act (for federal workers), or state and local laws, subject to court appeal. It often involves the employer’s efforts to avoid bargaining a contract in good faith. Other examples of possible ULPs are when management fails to provide information the union has requested and needs to process a grievance, or when management repeatedly fails to implement grievance settlements or arbitration awards. top (disclaimer) Always seek the advice of your local, regional or national union representatives pertaining to request for information. |
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. ACME INDUSTRIAL CO.
No. 52
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
385 U.S. 432
Argued November 14, 1966
January 9, 1967
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
COUNSEL: Norton J.
Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Marshall, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and
Nancy M. Sherman.
E. Allan Kovar argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard, Stephen I. Schlossberg and
Harriett R. Taylor filed a brief for Amalgamated Local Union No. 310,
UAW, AFL-CIO, intervenor.
JUDGES: Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas
OPINIONBY: STEWART
OPINION: MR. JUSTICE
STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
In NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., ante, p. 421,
decided today, we dealt with one aspect of an employer's duty to bargain
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. In this case we deal
with another - involving the obligation to furnish information that allows a
union to decide whether to process a grievance.
In April 1963, at [*4] the conclusion of a strike, the respondent entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the union which was the
certified representative of its employees. The agreement contained two
sections relevant to this case. Article I, § 3, provided, "It is the
Company's general policy not to subcontract work which is normally performed
by employees in the bargaining unit where this will cause the layoff of
employees or prevent the recall of employees who would normally perform this
work . . ." In Art. VI, § 10, the respondent agreed that "[in] the event the
equipment of the plant ... is hereafter moved to another location of the
Company, employees working in the plant ... who are subject to reduction in
classification or layoff as a result thereof may transfer to the new
location with full rights and seniority, unless there is then in existence
at the new location a collective bargaining agreement covering ... employees
at such location." A grievance procedure culminating in compulsory and
binding arbitration was also incorporated into the collective agreement.
The present controversy began in January 1964, when the union discovered
that certain [*5] machinery was being removed from the respondent's plant.
When asked by union representatives about this movement, the respondent's
foremen replied that there had been no violation of the collective agreement
and that the company, therefore, was not obliged to answer any questions
regarding the machinery. After this rebuff, the union filed 11 grievances
charging the respondent with violations of the above quoted clauses of the
collective agreement. The president of the union then wrote a letter to the
respondent, requesting "the following information at the earliest possible
date:
"1. The approximate dates when each piece of equipment was moved out of the
plant.
"2. The place to which each piece of equipment was moved and whether such
place is a facility which is operated or controlled by the Company.
"3. The number of machines or equipment that was moved out of the plant.
"4. What was the reason or purpose of moving the equipment out of the plant.
"5.Is this equipment used for production elsewhere."
The company replied by letter that it had no duty to furnish this
information since no layoffs or reductions in job classification had
occurred within five [*6] days (the time limitation set by the contract
for filing grievances) prior to the union's formal request for information.
This refusal prompted the union to file unfair labor practice charges with
the National Labor Relations Board. A complaint was issued, and the Board,
overruling its trial examiner, held the respondent had violated § 8 (a) (5)
of the Act n1 by refusing to bargain in good faith. Accordingly, it issued a
cease-and-desist order. The Board found that the information requested was
"necessary in order to enable the Union to evaluate intelligently the
grievances filed" and pointed out that the agreement contained no "clause by
which the Union waives its statutory right to such information."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a) (5).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
order. 351 F. 2d 258. It did not question the relevance of the information
nor the finding that the union [*7] had not expressly waived its right to
the information. The court ruled, however, that the existence of a provision
for binding arbitration of differences concerning the meaning and
application of the agreement foreclosed the Board from exercising its
statutory power. The court cited United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, and United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, as articulating a national labor policy favoring
arbitration and requiring the Board's deference to an arbitrator when
construction and application of a labor agreement are in issue. We granted
certiorari to consider the substantial question of federal labor law thus
presented. 383 U.S. 905.
[1]
[2]
There can be no question of the general obligation of an employer to provide
information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper
performance [*8] of its duties. Labor Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149. Similarly, the duty to bargain unquestionably extends beyond
the period of contract negotiations and applies to labor-management
relations during the term of an agreement. NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp., ante, p. 421; Labor Board v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
352 U.S. 938. The only real issue in this case, therefore, is whether the
Board must await an arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the
requested information before it can enforce the union's statutory rights
under § 8 (a) (5).
The two cases upon which the court below relied, and the third of the
Steelworkers trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, do not throw much light on the problem. For those
cases dealt with the relationship of courts to arbitrators when an
arbitration award is under review or when the employer's agreement to
arbitrate is in question. The weighing of the arbitrator's greater
institutional competency, which was so vital to those decisions, must be
evaluated in that context. 363 U.S., at 567, 581-582, 596-597. The
relationship [*9] of the Board to the arbitration process is of a quite
different order. See Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S.
261, 269-272. Moreover, in assessing the Board's power to deal with unfair
labor practices, provisions of the Labor Act which do not apply to the power
of the courts under § 301, n2 must be considered. Section 8 (a) (5)
proscribes failure to bargain collectively in only the most general terms,
but § 8 (d) amplifies it by defining "to bargain collectively" as including
"the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to ... any question arising [under an agreement] ..." n3 And § 10 (a) n4
provides: "The Board is empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice . . . This power shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established
by agreement, law, or otherwise ..." Thus, to view the Steelworkers
decisions as automatically requiring the Board in this case to defer [*10]
to the primary determination of an arbitrator n5 is to overlook important
distinctions between those cases and this one.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
n3 Cf. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581: "The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process."
n4 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a).
n5 See Sinclair Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 306 F. 2d 569, 570
(C.A. 5th Cir.).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [3]
But even if the policy of the Steelworkers Cases were thought to
apply with the same vigor to the Board as to the courts, that policy would
not require the Board to abstain here. For when it ordered the employer to
furnish the requested information to the union, the Board was not making a
binding construction of the labor contract. It was [*11] only acting upon
the probability that the desired information was relevant, and that it would
be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and
responsibilities. This discovery-type standard decided nothing about the
merits of the union's contractual claims. n6 When the respondent furnishes
the requested information, it may appear that no subcontracting or work
transfer has occurred, and, accordingly, that the grievances filed are
without merit. On the other hand, even if it appears that such activities
have taken place, an arbitrator might uphold the respondent's contention
that no breach of the agreement occurred because no employees were laid off
or reduced in grade within five days prior to the filing of any grievance.
Such conclusions would clearly not be precluded by the Board's threshold
determination concerning the potential relevance of the requested
information. Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction by the Board in this case
in no way threatens the power which the parties have given the arbitrator to
make binding interpretations of the labor agreement. n7
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Cf. 4 Moore, Federal Practice P26.16[1], 1175-1176 (2d ed.):
"[It] must be borne in mind that the standard for determining relevancy at a
discovery examination is not as well defined as at the trial. ... Since the
matters in dispute between the parties are not as well determined at
discovery examinations as at the trial, courts of necessity must follow a
more liberal standard as to relevancy."
Id., at 1181:
"Examination as to relevant matters should be allowed whether or not the
theory of the complaint is sound or the facts, if proved, would support the
relief sought." [*12]
n7 This case, therefore, differs from NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
ante, p. 421, where the Board's determination that the employer did not
have a contractual right to institute a premium pay plan was a determination
on the merits. See C & C Plywood, ante, at 426, and n. 10.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [4]
[5]
Far from intruding upon the preserve of the arbitrator, the Board's action
was in aid of the arbitral process. Arbitration can function properly only
if the grievance procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims.
For if all claims originally initiated as grievances had to be processed
through to arbitration, the system would be woefully overburdened. Yet, that
is precisely what the respondent's restrictive view would require. It would
force the union to take a grievance all the way through to arbitration
without providing the opportunity to evaluate [*13] the merits of the
claim. n8 The expense of arbitration might be placed upon the union only for
it to learn that the machines had been relegated to the junk heap. Nothing
in federal labor law requires such a result.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n8 See Fafnir Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F. 2d 716, 721:
"By preventing the Union from conducting these studies [for an intelligent
appraisal of its right to grieve], the Company was, in essence, requiring it
to play a game of blind man's bluff."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [6]
[7]
We hold that the Board's order in this case was consistent both with the
express terms of the Labor Act and with the national labor policy favoring
arbitration which our decisions have discerned as underlying that law.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Court of
Appeals with directions to enforce the Board's order.
Reversed and [*14] remanded.